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What does it take for a system, biological or not, to have goals? Here, this question is approached in the context of in 
silico artificial evolution. By examining the informational and causal properties of artificial organisms (“animats”) 
controlled by small, adaptive neural networks (Markov Brains), this essay discusses necessary requirements for 
intrinsic information, autonomy, and meaning. The focus lies on comparing two types of Markov Brains that 
evolved in the same simple environment: one with purely feedforward connections between its elements, the other 
with an integrated set of elements that causally constrain each other. While both types of brains ‘process’ 
information about their environment and are equally fit, only the integrated one forms a causally autonomous entity 
above a background of external influences. This suggests that to assess whether goals are meaningful for a system 
itself, it is important to understand what the system is, rather than what it does.  
 
0. Prequel 
It was a dark and stormy night, when an experiment of 
artificial evolution was set into motion at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. Fifty independent populations of 
adaptive Markov Brains, each starting from a different 
pseudo-random seed, were released into a digital world full 
of dangers and rewards. Who would make it into the next 
generation? What would their neural networks look like 
after 60,000 generations of selection and mutation?  
While electrical signals were flashing inside the 
computer, much like lightning on pre-historic earth, the 
scientist who, in god-like fashion, had designed the 
simulated universes and set the goals for survival, waited in 
suspense for the simulations to finish. What kind of 
creatures would emerge? … 
 
I. Introduction 
Life, from a physics point of view, is often pictured as 
a continuous struggle of thermodynamically open systems 
to maintain their complexity in the face of the second law 
of thermodynamics—the overall increase of entropy in our 
universe [1–3]. The ‘goal’ is survival. But is our universe 
like a game, in which organisms, species, or life as a whole 
increase their score by surviving? Is there a way to win? 
Does life have a chance if the ‘goal’ of the universe is a 
maximum entropy state (‘death’)? 
Maybe there is an underlying law written into the 
fabrics of our universe that aligns the ‘goal’ of life with the 
‘goal’ of the universe. Maybe ‘information’ is fundamental 
to discover it [4] (see also Carlo Rovelli’s essay 
contribution). Maybe all there is are various gradients, 
oscillations, or fluctuations. In any case, looming behind 
these issues, another fundamental question lingers: What 
does it take for a system, biological or not, to have goals?  
To approach this problem with minimal confounding 
factors, let us construct a universe from scratch: discrete, 
deterministic, and designed with a simple set of predefined, 
built-in rules for selection. This is easily done within the 
realm of in silico artificial evolution. One such world is 
shown in Fig. 1A (see also [5]). In this environment, the 
imposed goal is to categorize blocks of different sizes into 
those that have to be caught (‘food’) and those that have to 
be avoided (‘danger’), limiting life to the essential. 
Nevertheless, this task requires temporal-spatial integration 
of sensor inputs and internal states (memory), to produce 
appropriate motor responses. Fitness is measured as the 
number of successfully caught and avoided blocks.  
Let us then populate this simulated universe with 
‘animats’, adaptive artificial organisms, equipped with 
evolvable Markov Brains [5,6]. Markov Brains are simple 
neural networks of generalized logic gates, whose input-
output functions and connectivity are genetically encoded.  
For simplicity, the Markov Brains considered here are 
constituted of binary, deterministic elements. Over the 
course of thousands of generations, the animats adapt to 
their task environment through cycles of fitness-based 
selection and (pseudo) random genetic mutation (Fig. 1B). 
One particularly simple block-categorization environment 
requires the animats to catch blocks of size 1 and avoid 
blocks of size 3 (“c1-a3”) to increase their fitness.  
In silico evolution experiments have the great 
advantage that they can easily be repeated many times, with 
different initial seeds. In this way, a larger portion of the 
‘fitness landscape’, the solution space of the task 
environment, can be explored. In the simple c1-a3 
environment, perfect solutions (100% fitness) were 
achieved at the end of 13 out of 50 evolution experiments 
starting from independent populations run for 60,000 
generations. In the following we will take a look at the kind 
of creatures that evolved.  
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Fig. 1: Artificial evolution of animats controlled by Markov Brains. (A) The animat is placed in a 16 by 36 world with 
periodic boundaries to the left and right. An animat’s sensors are activated when a block is positioned above them, 
regardless of distance. Blocks of different sizes fall one at a time to the right or left. Animats can move to the left or right one 
unit per update. (B) An animat’s Markov Brain is initialized without connections between elements and adapts to the task 
environment through fitness-based selection and probabilistic mutation. Adapted from [7] with permission. 
 
II. Perfect fitness—goal achieved? 
As in nature, various possible adaptations provide 
distinct solutions to the c1-a3 environment. The animats we 
tested in this environment [5] could develop a maximal size 
of 2 sensors, 2 motors, and 4 hidden elements, but were 
started at generation #0 without any connections between 
them (Fig. 1B). We discovered 13 out of 50 strains of 
animats that evolved perfect fitness, using diverse 
behavioral strategies, implemented by Markov Brains with 
different logic functions and architectures (see two 
examples in Fig. 2).  
From mere observation of an animat’s behavior, it is 
notoriously difficult to compress its behavioral strategy into 
a simple mechanistic description (see [8] for an example 
video). In some cases, an animat might first ‘determine’ the 
size and direction of the falling block and then ‘follow’ 
small blocks or ‘move away’ from large blocks. Such 
narratives, however, cannot cover all initial conditions or 
task solutions. How can we understand an animat and its 
behavior? 
On the one hand, the animat’s Markov Brain is 
deterministic, consists of at most 8 elements, and we have 
perfect knowledge of its logic structure. While there is no 
single elegant equation that captures an animat’s internal 
dynamics, we can still describe and predict the state of its 
elements, how it reacts to sensor inputs, and when it 
activates its motors, moment by moment, for as long as we 
want. Think of a Markov Brain as a finite cellular 
automaton with inputs and outputs. No mysteries. 
On the other hand, we may still aim for a 
comprehensive, higher-level description of the animat’s 
behavior. One straightforward strategy is to refer to the goal 
of the task: “the animat tries to catch blocks of size 1 and 
avoid blocks of size 3”. This is, after all, the rule we 
implemented for fitness selection. It is the animat’s one and 
only ‘purpose’, programmed into its artificial universe. 
Note also that this description captures the animat’s 
behavior perfectly. After all, it is—literally—determined to 
solve the task. 
Is this top-level description in terms of goals useful 
and is it justified? Certainly, from an extrinsic, observer’s 
perspective, it captures specific aspects of the animat’s 
universe: the selection rule, the fact that there are blocks of 
size 1 and size 3, and that some of these blocks are caught 
by the animat and some are not, etc. But does it relate at all 
to intrinsic properties of the animat itself? 
To approach this question, first, one might ask 
whether, where, and how much information about the 
environment is represented in the animat’s Markov Brain. 
The degree to which a Markov Brain represents features of 
the environment might be assessed by information-theoretic 
means [6], for example, as the shared entropy between 
environment states E and internal states M, given the sensor 
states S: 
 𝑅 = 𝐻(𝐸:𝑀|𝑆).  ( 1 ) 
R captures information about features of the environment 
encoded in the internal states of the Markov Brain beyond 
the information present in its sensors. Conditioning on the 
sensors discounts information that is directly copied from 
the environment at a particular time step. A simple camera 
would thus have zero representation, despite its capacity to 
make > 107 bit copies of the world. 
For animats adapting to the block-catching task, 
relevant environmental features include whether blocks are 
small or large, move to the left or right, etc. Indeed, 
representation R of these features increases, on average, 
over the course of evolution [6]. While this result implies 
that representation of environmental features, as defined 
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above, is related to task fitness, the measure R itself does 
not capture whether or to what extent the identified 
representations actually play a causal role in determining an 
animat’s behavior1.  
Machine-learning approaches, such as decoding, 
provide another way to identify whether and where 
information about environmental variables is present in the 
evolved Markov Brains. Classifiers are trained to predict 
environmental categories from brain states—a method now 
frequently applied to neuro-imaging data in the 
neurosciences [9,10]. Roughly, the better the prediction, the 
more information was available to the classifier. Just as for 
R, however, the fact that information about specific stimuli 
can be extracted from a brain’s neural activity does not 
necessarily imply that the brain itself is ‘using’ this 
information [11].  
What about our animats? As demonstrated in Fig. 2, 
the c1-a3 block-categorization task can be perfectly solved 
by animats with as few as 2 hidden elements. Their capacity 
for representation is thus bounded by 4 bits (2 hidden 
elements + 2 motors). Is that sufficient for a representation 
of the goal for survival? At least in principle, 4 binary 
categories could be ‘encoded’. Yet, in practice, even a 
larger version of animats with higher capacity for 
representation (10 hidden elements) only achieved values 
on the order of R = 0.6 bits in a similar block-catching 
environment [6]. To solve this task, the animats thus do not 
seem to require much categorical information about the 
environment beyond their sensor inputs. 
While this lack of representation in the animats may 
be due to their small size and the simplicity of the task, 
there is a more general problem with the type of 
information measures described above: the information that 
is quantified is, by definition, extrinsic information.  
 
Fig. 2: Example network architectures of evolved 
Markov Brains that achieved perfect fitness in the c1-a3 
block-catching task. Adapted from [5] with permission. 
                                                            
1 Furthermore, representations of individual environmental 
features are typically distributed across many elements [6], and 
thus do no coincide with the Markov Brain’s elementary (micro) 
logic components.  
Any form of representation is ultimately a correlation 
measure between external and internal states, and requires 
that relevant environmental features are preselected and 
categorized by an independent observer (e.g. to obtain E in 
eq. 1, or to train the decoder). As a consequence, the 
information about the environment represented in the 
animat’s Markov Brain is meaningful for the investigator. 
Whether it is causally relevant, let alone meaningful, for the 
animat is not addressed.2  
 
III. Intrinsic information 
To be causally relevant, information must be 
physically instantiated. For every ‘bit’, there must be some 
mechanism that is in one of two (or several) possible states, 
and which state it is in must matter to other mechanisms. In 
other words, the state must be “a difference that makes a 
difference” [12,13].  
More formally, a mechanism M has inputs that can 
influence it and outputs that are influenced by it. By being 
in a particular state m, M constrains the possible past states 
of its inputs3, and the possible futures states of its outputs in 
a specific way. How much M in state m constrains its inputs 
can be measured by its cause information (ci); how much it 
constrains its outputs is captured by its effect information 
(ei) [13]. 
An animat’s Markov Brain is a set of interconnected 
logic elements. A mechanism M inside the Markov Brain 
could be one of its binary logic elements, but can in 
principle also be a set of several such elements4. In discrete 
dynamical systems, such as the Markov Brains, with 
discrete updates and states, we can quantify the cause and 
effect information of a mechanism M in its current state 𝑚, 
within system Z as the difference D between the 
constrained and unconstrained probability distributions over 
Z’s past and future states [13]: 
 𝑐𝑖(𝑀 = 𝑚,) = 𝐷 𝑝 𝑧,23|𝑚, , 𝑝 𝑧,23   ( 2 ) 
 𝑒𝑖(𝑀 = 𝑚,) = 𝐷 𝑝 𝑧,63|𝑚, , 𝑝 𝑧,63  ( 3 ) 
where 𝑧,23 are all possible past states of Z one update ago, 
and 𝑧,63 all possible future states of Z at the next update. 
For 𝑝 𝑧,23 , we assume a uniform (maximum entropy) 
distribution, which corresponds to perturbing Z into all 
                                                            
2 Note that this holds, even if we could evaluate the correlation 
between internal and external variables in an observer-independent 
manner, except then the correlations might not even be meaningful 
for the investigator. 
3 If M would not constrain its inputs, its state would just be a 
source of noise entering the system, not causal information. 
4 Sets of elements can constrain their joint inputs and outputs 
in a way that is irreducible to the constraints of their constituent 
elements taken individually [13]. The irreducible cause-effect 
information of a set of elements can be quantified similarly to 
Eqn. 2-3, by partitioning the set and measuring the distance 
between 𝑝 𝑧,±3|𝑚,  and the distributions of the partitioned set. 
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Fitness:	100%
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possible states with equal likelihood. Using such systematic 
perturbations makes it possible to distinguish observed 
correlations from causal relations [14]5. By evaluating a 
causal relationship in all possible contexts (all system 
states), we can obtain an objective measure of its specificity 
(“Does A always lead to B, or just sometimes?”) [13,15]. 
Likewise, we take 𝑝 𝑧,63  to be the distribution obtained 
by providing independent, maximum entropy inputs to each 
of the system’s elements [13]. In this way, Eqn. 2 and 3 
measure the causal specificity with which mechanism M in 
state 𝑚, constrains the system’s past and future states.  
A system can only ‘process’ information to the extent 
that it has mechanisms to do so. All causally relevant 
information within a system Z is contained in the system’s 
cause-effect structure, the set of all its mechanisms, and 
their cause and effect distributions 𝑝 𝑧,23|𝑚,  and 𝑝 𝑧,63|𝑚, . The cause-effect structure of a system in a 
state specifies the information intrinsic to the system, as 
opposed to correlations between internal and external 
variables. If the goals that we ascribe to a system are indeed 
meaningful from the intrinsic perspective of the system, 
they must be intrinsic information, contained in the 
system’s cause-effect structure (if there is no mechanism 
for it, it does not matter to the system).  
Yet, the system itself does not ‘have’ this intrinsic 
information. Just by ‘processing’ information, a system 
cannot evaluate its own constraints. This is simply because 
a system cannot, at the same time, have information about 
itself in its current state and also other possible states. Any 
memory the system has about its past states has to be 
physically instantiated in its current cause-effect structure. 
While a system can have mechanisms that, by being in their 
current state, constrain other parts of the system, these 
mechanisms cannot ‘know’ what their inputs mean6. In the 
same sense, a system of mechanisms in its current state 
does not ‘know’ about its cause-effect structure; instead, the 
cause-effect structure specifies what it means to be the 
system in a particular state7. Intrinsic meaning thus cannot 
arise from ‘knowing’, it must arise from ‘being’.  
What does it mean to ‘be’ a system, as opposed to an 
assembly of interacting elements, defined by an extrinsic 
observer? When can a system of mechanisms be considered 
an autonomous agent separate from its environment? 
                                                            
5 By contrast to the uniform, perturbed distribution, the 
stationary, observed distribution of system Z entails correlations 
due to the system’s network structure which may occlude or 
exaggerate the causal constraints of the mechanism itself. 
6 Take a neuron that activates, for example, every time a 
picture of the actress Jennifer Aniston is shown [22]. All it 
receives as inputs is quasi-binary electrical signals from other 
neurons. The meaning “Jennifer Aniston” is not in the message to 
this neuron, or any other neuron. 
7 For example, an AND logic gate receiving 2 inputs is what it 
is, because it switches ON if and only if both inputs were ON. An 
AND gate in state ON thus constrains the past states of its input to 
be ON. 
IV. To be or not to be integrated 
Living systems, or agents, more generally, are, by 
definition, open systems that dynamically and materially 
interact with their environment. For this reason, physics, as 
a set of mathematical laws governing dynamical evolution, 
does not distinguish between an agent and its environment. 
When a subsystem within a larger system is characterized 
by physical, biological, or informational means, its 
boundaries are typically taken for granted (see also [16]).  
Let us return to the Markov Brains shown in Fig. 2, 
which evolved perfect solutions in the c1-a3 environment. 
Comparing the two network architectures, the Markov 
Brain in Fig. 2A has only feedforward connections between 
elements, while the hidden elements in Fig. 2B feedback to 
each other. Both Markov Brains ‘process’ information in 
the sense that they receive signals from the environment 
and react to these signals. However, the hidden elements in 
Fig. 2B constrain each other, above a background of 
external inputs, and thus from an integrated system of 
mechanisms. 
Whether and to what extent a set of elements is 
integrated can be determined from its cause-effect structure, 
using the theoretical framework of integrated information 
theory (IIT) [13]. A subsystem of mechanisms has 
integrated information Φ > 0, if all of its parts constrain, 
and are being constrained by, other parts of the system. 
Every part must be a difference that makes a difference 
within the subsystem. Roughly, Φ quantifies the minimal 
intrinsic information that is lost if the subsystem is 
partitioned in any way. An integrated subsystem with Φ > 0 
has a certain amount of causal autonomy from its 
environment8. Maxima of Φ define where intrinsic causal 
borders emerge [17,18]. A set of elements thus forms a 
causally autonomous entity if its mechanisms give rise to a 
cause-effect structure with maximal Φ, compared to smaller 
or larger overlapping sets of elements. Such a maximally 
integrated set of elements forms a unitary whole (it is ‘one’ 
as opposed to ‘many’) with intrinsic, self-defined causal 
borders, above a background of external interactions. By 
contrast, systems whose elements are connected in a purely 
feedforward manner have Φ = 0: there is at least one part of 
the system that remains unconstrained by the rest. From the 
intrinsic perspective, then, there is no unified system, even 
though an external observer can treat it as one. 
So far, we have considered the entire Markov Brain, 
including sensors, hidden elements, and motors, as the 
system of interest. However, the sensors only receive input 
from the environment, not from other elements within the 
system, and the motors do not output to other system 
elements. The whole Markov Brain is not an integrated 
system, and thus not an autonomous system, separate from 
                                                            
8 This notion of causal autonomy applies to deterministic and 
probabilistic systems, to the extent that their elements constrain 
each other, above other background inputs, e.g. from the sensors.  
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its environment. Leaving aside the animat’s ‘retina’ 
(sensors) and ‘motor neurons’ (motors), inside the Markov 
Brain in Fig. 2B, we find a minimal entity with Φ > 0 and 
self-defined causal borders—a ‘brain’ within the Markov 
Brain. By contrast, all there is, in the case of Fig. 2A, is a 
cascade of switches, and any border demarcating a 
particular set of elements would be arbitrary.  
Dynamically and functionally the two Markov Brains 
are very similar. However, one is an integrated, causally 
autonomous entity, while the other is just a set of elements 
performing a function. Note again that the two systems are 
equally ‘intelligent’ (if we define intelligence as task 
fitness). Both solve the task perfectly. Yet, from the 
intrinsic perspective being a causally autonomous entity 
makes all the difference (see here [13,19]). But is there a 
practical advantage? 
 
V. Advantages of being integrated 
The cause-effect structure of a causally autonomous 
entity describes what it means to be that entity from its own 
intrinsic perspective. Each of the entity’s mechanisms, in its 
current state, corresponds to a distinction within the entity. 
Being an entity for which ‘light’ is different from ‘dark’, 
for example, requires that the system itself, its cause-effect 
structure, must be different when it ‘sees’ light, compared 
to when it ‘sees’ dark. In this view, intrinsic meaning might 
be created by the specific way in which the mechanisms of 
an integrated entity constrain its own past and future states, 
and by their relations to other mechanisms within the entity. 
The animat ‘brain’ in Fig. 2B, constituted of the 2 
hidden elements, has at most 3 mechanisms (each element, 
and also both elements together, if they irreducibly 
constrain the system). At best, these mechanisms could 
specify that “something is probably this way, not that way”, 
and “same” or “different”. Will more complex 
environments lead to the evolution of more complex 
autonomous agents? 
In the simple c1-a3 environment, animats with 
integrated brains do not seem to have an advantage over 
feedforward architectures. Out of the 13 strains of animats 
that reached perfect fitness, about half developed 
architectures with recurrent connections (6/13) [5]. 
However, in a more difficult block-catching environment, 
which required more internal memory (“catch size 3 and 6, 
avoid size 4 and 5”), the same type of animats developed 
more integrated architectures with higher Φ, and more 
mechanisms (one example architecture is shown in Fig. 
1B). The more complex the environment, the more 
evolution seems to favor integrated structures.  
In theory, and more so for artificial systems, being an 
autonomous entity is not a requirement for intelligent 
behavior. Any task could, in principle, be solved by a 
feedforward architecture given an arbitrary number of 
elements and updates. Nevertheless, in complex, changing 
environments, with a rich causal structure, where resources 
are limited and survival requires many mechanisms, 
integrated agents seem to have an evolutionary advantage 
[5,20]. Under these conditions, integrated systems are more 
economical in terms of elements and connections, and more 
flexible than functionally equivalent systems with a purely 
feedforward architecture. Evolution should also ensure that 
the intrinsic cause-effect structure of an autonomous agent 
‘matches’ the causal structure of its environment [21].  
From the animats, it is still a long way towards agents 
with intrinsic goals and intentions. What kind of cause-
effect structure is required to experience goals, and which 
environmental conditions could favor its evolution, remains 
to be determined. Integrated information theory offers a 
quantitative framework to address these questions. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
Evolution did produce autonomous agents. We 
experience this first hand. We are also entities with the right 
kind of cause-effect structure to experience goals and 
intentions. To us, the animats appear to be agents that 
behave with intention. However, the reason for this lies 
within ourselves, not within the animats. Some of the 
animats even lack the conditions to be separate causal 
entities from their environment. Yet, observing their 
behavior affects our intrinsic mechanisms. For this reason, 
describing certain types of directed behaviors as goals, in 
the extrinsic sense, is most likely useful to us from an 
evolutionary perspective. While we cannot infer agency 
from observing apparent goal-directed behavior, by the 
principle of sufficient reason, something must cause this 
behavior (if we see an antelope running away, maybe there 
is a lion). On a grander scale, descriptions in terms of goals 
and intentions can hint at hidden gradients and selection 
processes in nature, and inspire new physical models. 
For determining agency and intrinsic meaning in other 
systems, biological or not, correlations between external 
and internal states have proven inadequate. Being a causally 
autonomous entity from the intrinsic perspective requires an 
integrated cause-effect structure; merely ‘processing’ 
information does not suffice. Intrinsic goals certainly 
require an enormous amount of mechanisms. Finally, when 
physics is reduced to a description of mathematical laws 
that determine dynamical evolution, there seems to be no 
place for causality. Yet, a (counterfactual) notion of 
causation may be fundamental to identify agents and 
distinguish them from their environment. 
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